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Password-based user identification and authentication in a network-based 
operating system generally relies upon a single file that contains user information and the 
encoded or hashed representations of each users’ password.  Operating system designers 
have resorted to various protection schemes to prevent unauthorized access to this single 
file.  These techniques have proved vulnerable to various attacks, the result being 
unauthorized access to the targeted computer system.  This paper proposes a model for a 
distributed password system in a network environment that eliminates the single 
password file as a target without introducing additional computational complexity or 
incorporating additional cost to the user with such items as tokens or biometrics.  This 
application incorporates proven encryption techniques and a distributed architecture to 
enhance the reliability of an operating system’s identification and authentication 
procedures.  The paper provides an object-oriented model of this approach, along with an 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Unauthorized access to an information system is a hacker’s dream, a computer 
user’s or owner’s headache, and a computer administrator’s nightmare.  Some of the 
better-known attacks on computing systems over the past twenty years have relied to 
some extent on “cracking” password files in order for the attack program to obtain 
privileged use of the targeted system.  If the administrator account, or that of another 
trusted user, is compromised, then the entire information system may become 
compromised. 
As the sophistication of the techniques for protecting stored passwords has 
increased, so too have the methods used by adversaries to subvert such protection 
mechanisms.  Encryption has been used to protect stored and transmitted password data.  
However, examples abound of poorly implemented password encryption schemes, and of 
the use of password-encryption schemes that are not appropriate (e.g., not strong enough, 
or too strong) for use with a particular type of information system. 
B.  DISCUSSION 
An operating system bases much of its protection on “knowing” who a user of the 
system is [Ref. 1].  A valid user needs to be identified.  This is usually done with a user 
identification, or user id.  Though there is no standard convention, most systems use a 
combination of a valid user’s names and/or initials.  For example, the convention of using 
the first initial of the first name followed by the full last name would create for this 
author the user id of “croth.”  If there are multiple users with similar names, then a 
middle initial or a series of numbers (e.g. croth, croth2, etc.) might be used to distinguish 
each of the individuals.  Within a given system, a user id must be uniquely associated 
with only one user. 
Once the system is presented with a valid user id, the system must verify that the 
presenter is truly an authorized user, and not someone masquerading as an authorized 
user.  This is user authentication.  The authentication process is based on shared 
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knowledge that only the user and the computer would possess.  The most common 
mechanism is a password [Ref. 1].   
In response to input of a valid user id, the computer prompts the presenter of the 
id for the associated password.  The computer applies either an encryption algorithm or a 
hashing algorithm to the password and compares the result to what is stored in the 
password file.  If this value matches the value associated with the user id presented, then 
the user is granted access to the system.  If value does not match, then the user does not 
gain access to the system.   
Note that the passwords themselves are not stored.  It is the computed values 
associated with them that are stored on the system in a password file.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we may view a password file entry as consisting of a user id and the hashed or 
encrypted image of the user’s password.  The schemes by which these password files are 
stored mighty vary by system, but they all contain the same data: a list of user ids 
together with their associated password values. 
C. HYBRID ENCRYPTION SCHEME:  A WAY FORWARD 
In this thesis we introduce a hybrid encryption scheme that involves distributing 
the protection throughout the physical components of the information system, obviating 
the need for centralized storage of password data.  The scheme will use various 
encryption techniques in conjunction with the distributed protection to eliminate a single 
point of failure, or (in an adversary’s case) a single “golden target”: the password file.  
The scheme attempts to mitigate the risks to a systems password file from documented 
failures, as well as weaknesses that have been exploited, by building a more secure 
identification and authentication (I&A) process without incurring the additional costs of 












II. EXPLOITATION OF PASSWORDS AND PASSWORD FILES 
After 11 September 2002, the United States has become more aware of its 
vulnerabilities both in the physical world and in the cyber world.  Recently a USA Today 
newspaper article reported:   
The vast array of potential targets and the lack of adequate safeguards 
have made addressing the threat daunting. Among the recent targets that 
terrorists have discussed, according to people with knowledge of 
intelligence briefings: 
• The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, based in Atlanta. 
It is charged with developing the nation's response to potential 
attacks involving biological warfare.  
• The nation's financial network, which could shut down the flow of 
banking data. The attack would focus on the FedWire, the money-
movement clearing system maintained by the Federal Reserve 
Board.  
• Computer systems that operate water-treatment plants, which could 
contaminate water supplies.  
• Computer networks that run electrical grids and dams.  
• As many targets as possible in a major city. Los Angeles and San 
Francisco have been mentioned by terrorists, intelligence officials 
say.  
• Facilities that control the flow of information over the Internet. 
Richard Clarke, the White House special adviser on cybersecurity, 
says such sites, of which there are 20 to 25, are "only secure in 
their obscurity."  
• The nation's communications network, including telephone and 
911 call centers.  
• Air traffic control, rail and public transportation systems.  
Officials are most concerned that a cyberattack could be coupled with a 
conventional terrorist attack, such as those on Sept. 11, and hinder rescue efforts 
[Ref. 2].  
A. THE BASIS OF THE CONCERNS 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as the 
Oklahoma City bombing, showed that high-profile targets are vulnerable.  They also 
demonstrated that it is not hard to obtain the necessary weapons and training to carry out 
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such attacks on United States (U.S.) soil.  Although physical terrorist attacks on U.S. soil 
are relatively new, attacks on computer systems throughout the U.S. have occurred since 
computers became capable of communicating with one another. 
1.  Infomaster and the Penetration of Bureau of Land Management 
In the spring of 1992, “Infomaster”, a ‘hacker’ of limited skills but enormous 
persistence, had remotely penetrated the computer systems of the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) in Portland, Oregon [Ref. 3].  From there, he had access to the 
agency’s national network, which included the BLM office in Sacramento.  The 
computers in the Sacramento office controlled every dam in the northern part of the state 
[Ref. 3].  With a few simple commands, the attacker “could bury some of the world’s 
richest agriculture land beneath a tidal wave, killing hundreds of people, destroying 
thousands of homes, and throwing the futures (commodities) market into chaos.” [Ref. 3].  
Infomaster used basic techniques to gain access to the BLM and other networks.  He 
guessed passwords.  He penetrated and altered password files.  He used tools available to 
“crack” passwords [Ref. 3]. 
2.  The INTERNET Worm of 1987 
Even Robert T. Morris, the author of the INTERNET Worm that brought the 
infant INTERNET to a stop in 1987, used the weaknesses of passwords and password 
files in conjunction with the vulnerabilities in the sendmail program and the finger 
program [Ref. 1, 4].  The worm tried guessing passwords.  When it succeeded, it 
penetrated the system and captured the password file.  The password file contained the 
passwords in encrypted form, but the ciphertext of each password was visible.  Morris’ 
worm encrypted various popular passwords and compared the resulting ciphertext to the 
entries in the password file [Ref. 1, 4]. If unsuccessful, the worm tried the dictionary file 
stored on the system for use by spelling checkers [Ref. 1, 4].  Whenever it got a match, it 
would log into the account and then start looking for other machines to attack [Ref. 1, 4].  
Morris’ worm was classified as benign, in that it collected the account passwords but did 
not save them [Ref. 1]. 
3.  The First Documented Case of Cyber Espionage 
 As early as 1988, Clifford Stoll became the author of the first book documenting 
a case of cyber espionage.  As Stoll documented his case, he discovered that passwords 
4 
and password files became two of the main targets [Ref. 5].  Stoll “witnessed” the 
attacker editing password files, deleting the passwords from old users, and basically 
bringing old, inactive accounts to life [Ref. 5].  The attacker did not break the encryption, 
which at the time was done using the Data Encryption Standard (DES), but actually stole 
accounts by deleting or changing the passwords that were in the password file [Ref. 5]. 
4.  Password Insecurities of Tomorrow 
Though all these cases might seem dated to today’s more sophisticated attacks, 
passwords and password files are still prime targets of attackers.    It was recently 
discovered that, as Microsoft shifts its focus and strategy to its new .Net framework of 
integrated web-based software delivery, the Microsoft Developer Network 
documentation instructs developers to create a file containing users’ passwords and place 
it in a directory accessible from the Web, providing a potentially lucrative target for 
attackers [Ref. 6].   
B.   PRIMARY TARGET 
All of the actual cyber attacks illustrated above occurred when passwords and 
password files were compromised to give an attacker access to a system.  Once a system 
is penetrated, the exploitation of the password file allows the attacker further penetration, 
and escalation of rights and privileges.  The password file is a single target, which can 
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III. PASSWORD SCHEMES 
A. MICROSOFT NETWORKING OPERATING SYSTEMS 
In Microsoft’s network operating systems, Windows NT and Windows 2000, the 
passwords are not stored in clear text.  Windows NT stores user-related information in 
the System’s Account Manager (SAM) portion of the domain controllers’ registries.  The 
SAM does not store the actual passwords, but stores two 16-byte hash values of the 
password [Ref. 7].   
1.  Login and Authentication 
The passwords are never exchanged between the client and the server, either.  The 
NT network uses a challenge-and-response system, called Challenge Handshake 
Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [Ref. 7]. As a user logs in as a client, the client side 
calculates a 16-byte hash value of the user’s password [Ref. 7]. The client then connects 
to the server and sends the user id across the network [Ref. 7]. The server generates a 
random eight-byte nonce, known as the challenge, and sends it to the client [Ref. 7].  The 
client uses three distinct DES keys to encrypt the challenge.  Key one contains the first 
seven bytes of the password’s hash value [Ref. 7].  Key two contains the next seven bytes 
in the password’s hash.  Key three contains the remaining two bytes of the password’s 
hash, to which are appended five zero filled bytes.  The client system applies each key to 
the nonce so that the eight-byte challenge results in three 64-bit outputs, which is the 24-
byte response [Ref. 7].  After the server generates a nonce and sends the challenge, it 
looks up the user’s password hash value stored in the SAM database [Ref. 7]. The server 
then creates a response by performing the same calculation that the client performed 
using the nonce and hash value.  If the responses match, then the server authenticates the 
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   Figure 3.1 Challenge/Response Authentication [Ref. 7] 
 
2.  Password Storage 
The SAM file stores the password information using a one-way hashing 
algorithm.  Theoretically speaking, this is a function h which is easy to compute, but for 
which it is computationally infeasible to find two messages M and M’ such that h(M) = 
h(M’). [Ref. 8].  In other words, once the password is hashed using this function, the 
value cannot be decrypted by any practical method.  For all NT systems and Windows 
2000 stand-alone systems, the SAM file is kept in the file 
%systemroot%\system32\config\sam [Ref. 7].  On Windows 2000 domain controllers, 
this information is kept in the Active Directory (%systemroot%\ntds\ntds.dit) [Ref. 7].  
The format for the SAM files is the same in either case, but they are accessed differently 
[Ref. 7]. 
3.  System Key (SYSKEY) 
Later versions of NT (NT4 Service Pack 3) and Windows 2000 provided more 
security with an additional layer of encryption.  This additional layer is the System Key, 
or SYSKEY.  Once the hashes are computed, the SYSKEY then encrypts the hashes, 
using a random 128-bit key.  The SYSKEY can be stored in three ways:  in the registry 
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and available automatically upon boot-up (the default), in the registry but locked with a 
password that must be provided at boot time, or stored on a floppy disk that must be 
supplied at boot time [Ref. 7]. 
4.  Single Password File 
The final layer of protection is the SAM file and its content can only be accessed 
with Administrator privileges.  The bottom line is that, although it is protected, there still 
remains a single password file. 
B. UNIX 
Since there are multiple versions of the Unix operating system, we will discuss 
the generic password scheme.  
1.  Password File Storage 
Like Windows, Unix does not store passwords themselves in a password file, but 
stores the encrypted password along with some additional information.  A user types in a 
password of up to eight characters.  This is converted into a 56-bit value (using seven-bit 
ASCII) that serves as the key input into the encryption routine.  The encryption routine, 
known as crypt (3) is based on DES.  The DES algorithm is modified using a 12 bit “salt” 
value, which is usually tied to the value of the computer’s system clock at the time when 
the password was assigned to the user.  This modified algorithm is exercised with a data 
input consisting of 64-bit block of zeros.  The output is then used as the input for a 
second encryption.  The process is repeated for a total of 25 encryptions.  The resulting 
64-bit encryption is then translated into an 11-character sequence [Ref. 9, 10]. 
This result, along with a plaintext copy of the salt, is stored in the password file 
(figure 3.2).  The salt assists in the prevention of duplicate copies of the encrypted 
password.  The salt is tied to the time of password creation, then attached to the password 
before it goes through the encryption routine.  The chance that two users, with the same 
passwords, have the same encrypted value is one in 4096. [Ref .10].  The salt also 
increases the size of the password without any additional burden on the user, and it 
prevents the use of a hardware implementation of DES to assist in a brute force guessing 






2.  Crypt (3) Function Key move to next page 
The key used for the crypt (3) function is the user’s password; the actual encoded 
string is all nulls.  A point of clarification is needed.  Though most literature calls this 
encryption, cryptographers call this encoding, since the encoded string is all null. The salt 
is a two-character string chosen from the set [a-zA-Z0-9./], linked to the time at which 
the password was first created.  This allows the algorithm to be perturbed in one of 4096 
ways [Ref. 11]. 
 
Figure 3.2 UNIX Password Implementation. 
 
3.  User login 
When a user logs on to a Unix system, the user provides a unique user ID and a 
password.  The operating system then uses the user ID to index into the password file and 
retrieve the plaintext salt value and the encrypted password; these are used as input to the 









64 bit plaintext 
00000000 
(Initial Input) 
64 bit cipher text 
Hrew7n98 
64 bit cipher text 
Hrew7n98 
64 bit cipher text 
is used as input for 25 iterations 
Final 
64 bit cipher text 
11 characters +  
2 character salt 
 = 13 characters 
The eight-character password is converted into a 56-bit value (using 7-bit ASCII) 
that serves as the key input to the encryption routing. This 56-bit value allows the key 
space to consist of 256 possible values. 
 
4.  System Storage of the Password File  
Unix stores the password file in the /etc/passwd file.  This file is world-readable, 
meaning anyone can have access to the file.  Some versions, like LINUX, provide added 
protection by shadowing the password file.  This relocates the password file’s values to 
another file (/etc/shadow) so that it can be read only by a user with root privileges.  The 
original password file /etc/passwd no longer contains the encrypted values; it just 
contains an x value that indicates that the password files have been shadowed.  The 
encrypted passwords have not been changed or modified; they have just been moved to a 
more protective file. 
The shadow suite also adds additional security features, such as tracking password 
changes, age of password.  It also allows for the use of longer than eight character 
passwords.  Even with all the additional security features added, the system is still left 
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IV. PASSWORD IMPLEMENTATION 
A. WEAKNESSES OF PASSWORDS 
A user is identified by a unique user id and authenticated with a password.  The 
password should, in theory, be easy to remember, hard to guess, and only known to that 
user.  In actuality, passwords are one of the weaknesses of computer security. 
1.  Password Attacks 
Passwords can be attacked in several different manners.  An attacker could try all 
possible password combinations.  He could try many probable passwords.  Knowing the 
user might provide clues to the user’s password.  The system, or even the work area 
might contain the password, in a written or electronic form.  If all else fails, an attacker 
might just ask the user for the password.  Foundstone, Inc., a computer security 
consulting and training organization, states, “Weak passwords are the primary way in 
which we defeat Windows 2000 networks in professional penetration testing 
engagements.” [Ref. 7]. 
2.  Poor Password Choices 
Various studies from the late 1970s to today have shown that users tend to choose 
poor, easily guessable, or swiftly cracked passwords.  What’s worse, the studies show 
that users do not learn from previous mistakes or examples.  In 1979, a sample consisting 
of 3,300 passwords indicated that, given a reasonable amount of time using the tools 
available, eighty-six percent could be uncovered in one week.  [Ref. 1, 12] (Table 4.1 ). 
 
Actual Number Percent Description 
15 .5 % single ASCII character 
72 2% two ASCII character 
464 14% three ASCII character 
477 14% four alphabetic character 
706 21% five alphabetic characters, all of the same case 
605 18% six lowercase alphabetic characters 
492 15% words in dictionaries or lists of names 
2831 86% Total of all above categories 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Actual Passwords. From [Ref. 1]. 
 
The results of similar studies conducted in 1990 and 1992, in which five times as 
many passwords were collected, showed that the same problems were still occurring, 
13 
even after Morris’ Internet Worm of 1988 used these weaknesses to spread throughout 
the Internet, and eventually bring it to its knees [Ref. 1]. 
3.  Policies to Protect Passwords 
As system administrators and designers became more educated in how an attacker 
can gain access to a system through weak passwords, they established criteria for “good” 
passwords.  These were both written and computer enforced policies.  They included 
increasing the character space to include, not just letters and numbers but also special 
characters, changing the case at least once, making the password longer, avoidance of 
actual names or words, use of an unlikely password, regular replacement of the password 
and the strong recommendation that passwords should neither be written down nor shared 
[Ref. 1].   
A password of length of three characters or less of a single case can be any one of 
26 + 262 + 263 = 18,278 possible combinations.  Using an assumed rate of one password 
per millisecond, every combination could be tried in 18.278 seconds.  Even increasing the 
character length to four or five increases the time to approximately eight minutes or three 
and one-half hours, respectively.  Pfleeger states that it would take one hundred hours to 
test all six-letter words from letters of only one case, but it would take approximately two 
years to test all six-symbol passwords from the set of all upper- and lower-case letters 
and all decimal digits.  Using single-case letters, there are 266 possible six-character 
passwords.  Searching for all possible combinations in a standard English collegiate 
dictionary, 99.95% of these would not be found [Ref. 1].    
Even with the advent of these policies, the implementation of passwords yielded 
additional vulnerabilities that could be exploited.  Some of these vulnerabilities were 
caused by users who managed to adhere to the letter of the policies as opposed to the 
spirit of the policies.  Others were based on flawed implementations produced by the 
manufacturers of the systems.  
B. WINDOWS FLAWS 
The SYSKEY was added to later versions of NT and implemented in WINDOWS 
2000.  The SYSKEY provides another layer of protection of the password file.  It actually 
takes the hashes in the password file and further encrypts them.  This was to prevent a 
brute force attack or dictionary attack.  As stated previously, the SYSKEY could be 
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stored several different ways, and added another layer of protection.  SYSKEY applies a 
second, 128-bit strong round of encryption to the password hashes using a unique key 
that is either stored in the registry, optionally protected by a password, or on a floppy disk 
[Ref. 7, 13]. However, these measures provide a false sense of security due to backward 
compatibility issues. 
1.  Old Hash Conversion 
A user can actually inject fraudulent hashes and bypass WINDOWS’ security 
features.  Petter Nordhal-Hagen actually developed a tool that allows an attacker who has 
physical control of the box to boot a WINDOWS box into a LINUX operating system.  
The tool pulls the SAM file into a temporary directory, and then allows an attacker to 
change the password of any user.  It does this by using Microsoft’s hashing algorithm.  It 
then places the new hashes into the SAM file, and writes the new SAM file back into the 
system.  Nordhal-Hagen also discovered that if the SYSKEY is enabled, it will 
automatically convert the old-style hashes (without the SYSKEY’s encryption) to the 
new SYSKEY’ed hashes once the system is rebooted [Ref. 7] (Figure 4.1 ).  The 
WINDOWS security features do not log the changes because they are done in a different 
operating system.  This attack will not work with the WIN2K domain controllers, 
because they store the password hashes in the active directory and not in the SAM file.  
But a more refined technique, to which the WIN2K domain controllers are susceptible, 
might not be far off [Ref. 7, 13]. 
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Figure 4.1 Nordhal-Hagen WIN2K/NT Password Recovery Tool 
 
There are versions of the utility that boot the system into MS-DOS, and then 
change the passwords by changing the hashes.  Again, the hashes are never “cracked;” 
they are just rewritten. 
2.  Password “Cracking” 
Even though there are no known mechanism for decrypting the passwords hashed 
using the NT/2000 algorithms, password are recovered from the hashes using various 
tools [Ref. 7].  L0phtcrack and John the Ripper are just a few of the tools that duplicate 
the hashing techniques that WINDOWS uses to match hashes stored in the SAM file 
[Ref. 7].  What makes it even easier to match the hashes is another flaw in the Microsoft 
networking operating system in order to make it backward compatible with its 





Figure 4.2 L0phtCrack 2.5 
 
a. Backward Compatibility  
(1.) Local Area Network Manager (LANMan).  This backward 
compatibility issue has come back to haunt Microsoft’s network operating system.  It is 
the implementation of the Local Area Network (LAN) Manager hash.  This is a key 
design failing of Windows NT/2000 [Ref. 7, 13].  Both NT and WIN2000 store two 
versions of hashes for a user:  the LANManager  (LM) hash and the NT LANManager 
(NTLM) hash. 
  The first eight bytes of the LM hash are derived from the first 
seven characters of the user’s password, and the second 8 bytes are derived through the 
eighth through the fourteenth character [Ref. 7, 13]. An eight-character password actually 
reduces to a seven-character password together with a one-character password (figure 
4.3).  Searching the space of seven-character strings is not difficult with modern 
computers.  Both tools mentioned automate this process, making it very easy to match the 
hashes [Ref. 7, 13, 14].  
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 First 8 bytes 
of LM Hash 
Second 8 bytes 
of LM Hash 
Derived from first 7 
Characters of account password 
Derived from second 7 
Characters of account password 
Figure 4.3 LanMAN Hash [Ref. 7]. 
 
The system administrator does have the ability to turn off the storage of the LM hash, but 
there are consequences.  This can break certain applications, and is only recommended on 
test systems, not on actual production systems [Ref. 7].  Even by disabling the LM 
storage, currently-stored LM hashes are not erased [Ref. 7]. The only way to prevent the 
need for an LM hash for authentication is to have a strictly homogenous Windows 2000 
environment using the built-in Kerberos v5 protocol that is new in Windows 2000 [Ref. 
7].  This is not a default setting, while the LM hash is, and there is currently no 
mechanism to force the use of Kerberos [Ref. 7]. 
(2..)  Local Security Policy Setting Store.  Another compatibility 
issue is in the Local Security Policy Setting Store Passwords with Reversible Encryption.  
Though this is only applicable on the Active Directory Domain Controllers, it does lead 
to the ability of passwords being stored in a reversible encryption, instead of a one-way 
hash.  By default it is turned off, but, if the Domain Controller is compromised by an 
attacker, this setting can be enabled.  This forces all newly created passwords to be stored 
in the SAM/AD form as normal, and also in a separate reversible encrypted format [Ref. 
7].  Microsoft uses this with remote protocols and services like MSChap v1, Digest 
Authentication, Apple Talk Remote Access, and Internet Authentication Services, all of 
which require this setting.  Although there is no tool that could dump the plaintext 
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passwords while Reversible Encryption is enabled, the ability to create one does exist 
[Ref. 7]. 
 
C. UNIX FLAWS 
Older versions of UNIX, and the modern UNIX-flavor operating systems, use 
DES for their encryption.  DES is limited to eight characters as the key, so in actuality a 
user is limited to only an eight-character password.  Newer versions of the software have 
replaced DES with the MD5 hashing algorithm.  This has improved on DES in several 
ways.  The key is no longer limited to eight characters.  In actuality the passwords could 
have infinite length.  The MD5 keyspace is larger than DES. 
1.  World Readable Password File 
Even with the switch to from DES to MD5, the password file is still world- 
readable.  Having a password file world-readable allows any user to grab it, take the 
hashes, and run them through a password cracker.  Current versions of Linux add the 
additional protection of “shadowing” the password file.  The shadow password file 
contains the encrypted or hashed versions of the passwords on the system and makes 
them readable by root.  Shadowing is considered essential for password security [Ref. 
11]. There are packages that allow for modification of older Unix operating systems, to 
create a shadow file.  At the same time, there are current versions of UNIX that are still 
not using the shadow capability.  The most surprising is that MAC OS X, built on Open 
BSD, has a utility called NetInfo that “has a ‘feature’ that, strangely, gives out the hashed 
passwords to ANY user that is logged on (not sure if this is because it isn't using a 
shadow password file, or if NetInfo just plain compromises the shadow).   There is a 
utility called ‘Malevolence’ that will allow a user to view the password file.” [Ref. 15].  
2.  Shadow Password File Vulnerability 
Even shadow passwords and shadow password files are not totally secure.  
Carolyn Mienel has documented several attacks that work on the shadow file on many, 
but not all UNIX systems.  One attack involves creating a program that makes successive 
calls to the getpwent( ) to obtain the password file.  There are sometimes backup shadow 
password files that are readable.  Even a core dump or segmentation fault that occurs 
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while running a program that must access a password will contain the password.  
Searching through the core dump will provide both user name and password [Ref. 16]. 
Even with all the additional protection of a shadow password, if an attacker 
manages to gain root access, he can access the shadow password file.  The shadow 
password file could then be run through a password cracker for Unix-flavor systems, such 
as Crack or John the Ripper.  Crack was written with the versatility to use either DES or 
MD5 for the crypt function.  There is also a password cracker called Slurpie that runs in a 
distributed environment, using multiple machines.  This decreases the time needed to 
crack the password file [Ref. 11]. 
Unix use of passwords leaves a password exposed in various states and utilities 
throughout the system.  If not properly configured, the password can be relatively 
unprotected and be retrieved by an attacker.  For example, if the utility for downloading 
email from a remote server is run in a daemon mode, instead of user running it 
individually, the utility will look for the user’s password in its control file.  The 
passwords are stored in this file in clear text.  The challenge and response authentication 
for Post Office Protocol version 3 (POP3), known as Popauth, requires that the server 
have access to the user’s clear text-password.  Popauth must store the user’s POP3 
password in a separate database.  This causes two problems.  The systems and the POP3 
password databases must be synchronized with one another.  The second, who is more 
serious, is Popauth stores the password in its database using a reversible encryption.  This 
file is relatively easy to compromise.  What is worse is that the compromise of this file 
means the system’s password file is compromised [Ref. 11].  
D. GENERAL WEAKNESSES OF PASSWORDS 
Passwords are “cracked” using three methods.  These are attacks on password 
files, dictionary attacks, and the brute force method. 
Both the length of the password (the number of alphanumeric characters) and the 
set of permissible characters (letters, upper and lower case, numbers, additional symbols 
(i.e.,!, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, etc.) determine how fast a password can be “cracked.”  For 
example, using a password that is four characters in length and consists of upper and 
lower case letters (alphabet size 52), there are 524 possible passwords.  Given a 
password-cracking program that can generate, encrypt and compare 106 strings per 
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minute, it will take approximately seven minutes to try all four-character strings.  As we 
increase the alphabet size as well as the length of the password, the time to crack a 
password by brute force would increase.  Given a password of exactly eight characters in 
length, using the same alphabet size, the number of possible passwords has increased to 
528.  Using the original password-cracking program, given the same hypothetical 106 
strings per minute, it would take approximately fifty years, on average, to determine the 
password.  The password cracking programs that are currently available, both 
commercial and freeware, can run faster than this, due to faster processors, updated 
software, and more efficient coding of attack tools [Ref. 1]. Though no formal statistical 
analysis has been done, in 1999, Jim Williams, running L0phtcrack 2.5 on a Pentium 166, 
cracked three-letter passwords in seconds and six-letter passwords in seven minutes, 
using a dictionary attack.  By allowing the attack to run overnight, he was able to crack 
seven and eight character alphanumeric passwords in less than eight hours.  More 
recently, @Stake has released L0phtcrack version 3.0, and today’s processors are faster 
by an order of magnitude than those discussed here [Ref. 17]. 
Even L0pht Heavy Industries’ engineers have posted some startling statistics.  
During an audit that they performed of a large high-technology company, using their 
older version of the software, 90 percent of the passwords were cracked in under 48 hours 
on a Pentium II/300.  Eighteen percent of these passwords were cracked in less than 10 
minutes.  More importantly, the Administrator and most of the Domain Admin passwords 
were cracked even though the company had a policy requiring passwords longer than 
eight characters with at least one upper case character plus a numeric or symbol character 
[Ref. 17]. 
These statistics are all based on the brute-force method of trying every 
combination possible.  Using a dictionary attack, or what L0phtcrack calls a “Hybrid” 
attack, in which dictionary words are mixed with other characters (e.g., 1banana2), the 
time required would not be as long.  This attack is based on the assumption that a user 
would pick a word that is contained in a dictionary file used in the attack.  
As previous stated, the password file is one of the primary targets of an attacker.  
Knowing this, we want to eliminate the target.  Passwords have been a part of the I&A 
process from the beginning.  They have also been one of the Achilles’ heels of computer 
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systems.  The problems associated with passwords generally result from their being too 
simple, or too common, to too personal (e.g., containing birth dates, or names of 
children).  Attackers understand this and have created a methodology for testing 
passwords based on user information, as well as tools for breaking passwords. 
As security professionals have come to understand this, more stringent password 
selection guidelines have been implemented with some success.  However, as recently as 
April 2002, studies have shown that approximately fifty percent of computer users base 
passwords on the name of a family member, and about thirty percent use a public figure 
such as a sporting hero or a media idol.  Based on the study conducted by Pentasafe 
Security Technologies Ltd., psychologists at City University in London stated that it is 
possible to predict passwords based on the personality of the user, or even on the items 
on a users desk [Ref. 18]. 
E.   IMPLEMENTATION OF PASSPHRASES 
Knowing the weaknesses of passwords, computer security experts often advocate 
the expansion of the password to a passphrase.  Passphrases meet three security goals of 
the security-oriented network administrator: 
1.  They are easy to remember. 
2. They are difficult to guess or crack (or at least harder than            
passwords), by virtue of their greater length. 
3.  They are inexpensive to implement. 
 
Given a passphrase, one can modify it in various ways.  This modification should 
be chosen to remain easy to remember but more difficult to crack [Ref. 17, 19].  Security 
experts recommend setting the default length of passwords to the longest available to the 
system [Ref. 17, 18, 19].  
Various programs have implemented passphrases instead of passwords.  Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) uses passphrases to generate private keys for public-key 
cryptography.  The forty-character passphrase is converted into a random key using a 
one-way hashing function.  This technique is called key crunching.  It creates a pseudo-
random bit string, which is used as a key for encryption. 
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If increasing the length of passwords makes them harder to “crack”, why not just 
replace passwords with passphrases throughout all computer systems for Identification 
and Authentication?   
Passphrases that are English words are relatively weak out to a length of twenty 
characters.   The reason is that, for long streams of text, the redundancy in English is such 
that each of the 26 letters is comparable to 1.5 to 2.3 bits (as opposed to 4.7 bits if all 
letters were equally likely) [Ref. 14].  This means that breaking a 15-character passphrase 
is effectively impossible if the passphrase is randomly chosen from all character 
combinations, while it is relatively simple if the password is known to be an English 
phrase [Ref. 14]. 
The modified passphrases, either encoded or hashed, would be stored in a single 
file.  Security experts still expect password cracking programs to uncover passphrases 
after sustained effort [Ref. 17].  The weaknesses of the passphrases with the known 
encryption schemes contribute to this.  If additional factors that contribute to cracking 
passphrases are factored in, a forty-character passphrase may not be as formidable as 
originally thought.  Cryptographers have asserted that searching through forty-character 
phrases is actually easier than searching through 64-bit random keys [Ref. 20].  A variety 
of techniques are employed, including Markov chains, phonetic generation algorithms, 
and concatenation of small words, in the cracking of passphrases [Ref. 14]. 
Hackers have even attacked PGP’s forty-character passphrases. PGPCrack is a 
widely distributed brute-force utility, designed for cracking conventionally PGP-
encrypted files and attacking the secret key's passphrase.  PGPCrack relies on a 
dictionary file, trying each word as a potential passphrase.   On a conventionally 
encrypted PGP file, the utility cycled through over 15,000 words per second on a 100 
MHz Pentium.  As a point of reference, compare this to the 5,000 to 7,000 words per 
second tested by typical UNIX password cracking utilities on the same machine [Ref. 
21].   
Passphrases add to the protection against a straight dictionary attack on a 
password file.  In this context, the advantage of a passphrase is that it is a concatenation 
of multiple words, and will therefore not be found in any conventional dictionary.  An 
additional benefit, due to a passphrases’ length, is that an attacker’s attempt to guess an 
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V.  A DISTRIBUTED PASSWORD SCHEME FOR NETWORK 
OPERATING SYSTEMS 
The Distributed Password Scheme (DPS) consists of three parts. These are the 
login use of a passphrase, the segmentation of the passphrase, and the encryption and 
storage of these segments. 
A. MIGRATION FROM PASSWORDS TO PASSPHRASES 
The first implementation of the DPS would be an increase of the typical password 
size of eight characters to something larger; here we consider a passphrase consisting of 
approximately forty spaces.  A typical dictionary attack would be useless against a forty-
character passphrase, since there are no forty-character words in the standard English 
dictionary.  This in itself is not a new concept.  Computer security experts have been 
proposing a shift to passphrase for some time [Ref. 17, 19].  
The use of non-dictionary words and special characters has forced attackers to 
alter their methods and their tools.  Now, instead of using a dictionary attack, they need 
to use every possible string over the chosen alphabet.  Such a brute force attack, though 
taking longer to crack passwords, would eventually be successful.  Nevertheless, simply 
increasing the alphabet size and increasing the password length will help in making the 
authentication process more secure. On the other hand, Moore’s Law states that the speed 
of the microprocessors will double approximately every eighteen months to two years.  
As the processor speed increases so will the search speed.  This leads us into the second 
part of the DPS, which is its increased use of cryptography. 
Currently, all of the password-cracking tools used to attack the password file are 
based on knowledge of the encryption methods or hashing schemes that are implemented 
by the operating system.  Tools such as “John the Ripper,” a password “cracker” for Unix  
systems, and L0phtcrack and Nordhal-Hagen’s Password recover tool for Microsoft 
operating systems use the password protection schemes to match hashes or encryptions to 
discover the passwords.  Nordhal’s Password recovery tool actually allows an attacker to 
change the password of a user.  The tool creates a hash for the new password, using 
Microsoft’s hashing scheme implementation, then inserts the new hash, overwriting the 
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old hash, and so changing the password.  This is all done from outside the Microsoft 
environment, consequently bypassing Microsoft’s security and audit features. 
B. DPS IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION  
The DPS still retains the standard Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
procedures.  A user logs into a computer using his user id, which is unique.  Along with 
the user id, the user responds with a forty-character passphrase.  The user ID and pass 
phrase are passed to an I&A server (figure 5.1). 
 





User ID: croth 
Passphrase:2bornot2bthatisthequestionwhethertisnobl 
 
The I&A server would first verify that the user id is valid by consulting a list on 
the server (Table 5.1).  Associated with each valid user id would be a permutation of the 
set {1,2,3,4,5}.  These permutations are themselves associated with 5!=120 different 
encryption methods.  The user’s passphrase is broken into five segments, and the 
encryption method applied to the jth segment is determined by the jth component in the 
associated permutation.   The sequence of permutations would be “randomly” generated.  
After 120 users, a new sequence would begin. 
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Table 5.1 user_id Table 
 
We will demonstrate this procedure using the forty-character passphrase,  
“2bornot2bthatisthequestionwhethertisnobl,” and user id, “croth”.  We first break this 
phrase into five, eight-character segments (see table 5.2). 
 
 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 
2bornot2 bthatist hequesti onwhethe rtisnobl 
Table 5.2  Segmented Passphrase 
 
Each of these segments would then be passed from the I&A server to an 
encryption device, as determined by the table on the I&A server.  We propose a separate 
encryption device, not co-located with the I&A server, for each segment.  In this 
example, we would use five separate computers for encryption. 
Returning to our example above, the user croth’s pass phrase has been segmented.  
The I&A server passes each segment, along with the user id, to the assigned encryption 
device.  Continuing with the example above, Segment 1 (2bornot2) would go to 
encryption device 2, Segment 2 (bthatist) would go to encryption device 3, Segment 3 






Passphrase Segment 3: 
croth  hequest 
Passphrase Segment 5: 
croth  rtisnobl 
Passphrase Segment 4: 
croth  onwhethe 
Passphrase Segment 2: 
croth  hequest 
Passphrase Segment 1: 







Figure 5.2 Encryption of Segments  
 
The I&A server would not do any of the encryption itself.  The only information 
that it would store would be the user ID and the sequence.  The only information that it 
would pass to each encryption device would be the user ID along with the assigned 
segment.  At this point, the I&A server would wait for responses from the encryption 
devices, either confirming or denying that the segment is valid for this user. 
C. ENCRYPTION PHASE 
The next phase of the DPS is the encryption phase.  The encryption itself is not 
the weakness that enables password cracking. Passwords are not reverse-engineered by 
inverting the hash or the encryption.  Rather, the same encryption scheme used by the 
operating system under attack is used to encrypt or hash words or phrases in an attempt to 
match what is stored in the password file.  What DPS proposes is the incorporation of 
multiple encryption schemes in the I&A process.  By segmenting the passphrase, using 
multiple encryption methods, and storing the hashes separately, we mitigate the risks 




1.  Encryption Devices 
Each of the encryption devices would receive its segment of the passphrase and 
the user id.  The simplest way to understand the process is to compare each of the 
encryption devices, or servers, to an instance of the current password that holds only one 
fifth of the actual passphrase (figure 5.3 ). 
After the initial installation, each of the encryption devices would have a 
particular encryption method installed. We propose to allow the option of using different 
encryption methods for each device.  In fact, we would encourage this.  The idea is to use 
encryption methods that have been accepted by cryptographers for use with passwords 
(e.g., DES, 3DES, MD5 hashing, Advanced Encryption Standard) in a multi-layer 
defense.  Each device would have its own encryption scheme and a database containing 
the user id and cryptographic value of the input segment. 
In our example, Segment 1 (2bornot2) would go to encryption device 2.  
Encryption Device 2 is using Data Encryption Standard (DES).  Upon receipt, encryption 
device 2 would encrypt the segment and compare it to the value in the database.  If the 
value in the database equals the encryption value, then this segment is accepted as valid.  
 
 
DES User ID E(seg) 
croth  jksdjgroie9 
Stored Encrypted Segment 
Segmented Passphrase # 1
2bornot2 
Encryption Device 2 





Figure 5.3 DES Encryption Example 
 
29 
The encryption device sends a validation back to the server for this segment (figure 5.4 ). 
Each of the encryption devices would go through the same sequence of steps, 
returning a validation or denial to the I&A server.  The difference would be that each 
encryption device would use a different encryption scheme.  The encryption devices 
would not interact with one another, and each would be responsible only for its own 



















Figure 5.4 Responses Back to Server 
 
Only after the I&A server has received all five validations, one from each 
encryption device, would the user be authenticated.  If any response comes back negative, 
the user is denied access to the system.   
Upon receipt of a full set of validations, the user is authorized access to the 
computer system. 
D.   ANALYSIS OF THE DPS ALGORITHM 
After observing that a single password file is vulnerable and often exploited, we 
have informally outlined a possible solution, which is to distribute the password file.  
Whether the DPS is a viable scheme remains to be determined.  We must ensure that the 
30 
scheme will actually work, and that the additional complexity will be acceptable.  To 
facilitate this analysis, we state the DPS procedure more formally. 
 
Algorithm for LOGIN 
id   string 
phrase  string 
read id 
read phrase 
IDENTIFY (id, phrase) 
 
Upon user login, the system reads the user’s credentials, id, and phrase.  These 
credentials are passed to the Identification and Authentication server using the 
IDENTIFY procedure.. 
Algorithm for IDENTIFY 
 
IDENTIFY (user_id, passphrase)  // user_id and passphrase read in by 
      // login procedure 
 
valid      boolean 
x,y, i, j,     integers 
user_id, passphrase, segment   string 
sequence_num[ ] array   //array of numbers no larger than five  
      // elements consisting 1-5 
user_table   record   //  Table consisiting of a user_id, 
      //  with an associated five digit  
      //  sequence number 
 
valid ← true 
x ← 1 
y ← 8 
i ← 1 
j ← 0 
 
if (SEARCH (user_table, user_id) not = 0)  // search returns seq_num[ ] 
       // if user_id found 
 then 
  do while (valid and i < 6)  // sentinel control for while 
       // loop breaks if any 
       // authenticates return false 
       // or if all five authenticates 
       // return true 
segment ← PARTITION (passphrase, x, y) 
j ← sequence_num[i] 
i ← i + 1 
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x ← x + 8 
y ← y + 8 
   
if j = 1 
then valid ← AUTHENTICATE_1 (user_id, segment) 
else if j = 2 
then valid ← AUTHENTICATE_2 (user_id, 
segment) 
    else if j =3 
     then valid ← AUTHENTICATE_3 …. 
… 
if (not valid) access denied 




 The algorithm calls the SEARCH routine to verify that the user_id exists in the 
user table.  If the user_id exist, then segment each portion of the passphrase with the 
PARTITION procedure.  Each segment is then paired with the value of the ith element of 
the sequence number, authenticated using the AUTHENTICATE_procedures.  If any of 
the AUTHENTICATE procedures returns false, or if they all return true, control breaks 





sequence_num ← nil 
count ← 0 
 while count < size of user table 
 do  count ← count +1 
  if user_id = user_table [count] 
   then   sequence_num ← sequence_table [count] 
  else 
return sequence_num 
 
SEARCH searches the user_id_table, indexed on the user_id.  If the user_id is 
found, then the sequence number is returned.  If the user_id is not found (invalid user) 
then nil is returned. 
 
PARTITION (passphrase, x, y) 
segment string 
segment ← copy passphrase starting at the xth character 
ending at the yth character 
return  segment 
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PARTITION copies the passphrase starting at the xth character and ending at the 
yth character, creating an eight character segment.  It then returns this segment 
AUTHENTICATE 
AUTHENTICATE (user_id, segment) 
if SEARCH (user_id) not = 0   // Searches encryption table 
       // indexed on user.  If user exist 
// return encrypt_tag_seg else return 
// 0 
       // encrypted_table_segment 
then 
if ENCRYPT(segment) = encrypt_tab_seg 
  then return true 
else 
return false   // calls the preset encryption 
//routine 
// returns encrypted segment 
else 
return false. 
AUTHENTICATE searches the encryption table for a valid user id.  If the user id 
is found, the segment is encrypted and compared to the encrypt_tab_seg.  If both these 
values are equal, the procedure returns true.  Otherwise the procedure returns false.  Since 
each AUTHENTICATE procedure is the same (except the actual ENCRYPT function) it 
only needs to be listed once. 
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The DPS does not use new storage, search or encryption techniques.  The purpose 
of the DPS is to build on tools that are already available and in current use.  Even the 
encryption will not add additional complexity because each encryption device is handling 
one segment and doing one set of calculations..  There are five segments that need to be 
encrypted, but each is being processed at a separate location in constant time.  The 
complexity of encryption can therefore be reduced to a constant.  It follows that the 
overall complexity of this authentication procedure is driven solely by the search 
implementation.  Since the search algorithms for the sequence table and the encryption 
table are standard linear searches, with run time O(n)  [Ref.8], our scheme requires O(n) 
time, where n is the number of entries in the user table.  This complexity may be reduced 
further, if required, by implementing other search and storage algorithms. 
E.   UML MODEL 
After determining that the DPS adds no significant computational complexity, the 
next step is an analysis of the design.  The DPS is an ideal candidate for using an object-
oriented approach.  This allows us to model the DPS in the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML). 
Analysis emphasizes the investigation of the problem rather than definition of a 
solution [Ref. 22].  In the DPS system, we have determined that the problem in current 
computer systems is the implementation of a single password file and the vulnerabilities 
associated with this file. 
The design phase emphasizes a high-level and detailed description of a logical 
solution and the way in which it fulfills the requirements and constraints in effect [Ref. 
22].  Using UML, we can finish both the analysis and the design phase in an object-
oriented analysis and design.  This will allow ease of transition during the construction or 
object oriented programming, because the design components could than be implemented 
in such object oriented languages as C++, Java, Smalltalk, or Visual Basic, to name just a 
few [Ref. 22, 23].  
We can easily describe the DPS using UML Use Cases.  Table 5.3 and 5.4 show 
the high level Use Case and the expanded level Use Case for the DPS.  Specifically, they 
describe the user login procedures. 
 
Use Case Login 
Actors: User 
Type: Primary (to be discussed) 
Description: User attempts to login into a computer 
system.  The user passes credentials to the 
system for Identification and 
Authentication.  Upon acceptance of 
credentials, user access the system 
 
Table 5.3 High Level Use Case 
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The expanded case allows us to show more detail, and essentially obtain a deeper 
understanding of the DPS process and requirements. 
 
Use Case: User Login 
Actors: User 
Purpose: Identify and Authenticate user to the 
network or system 
Overview A user logs into a client workstation 
presenting a user id and passphrase.  The 
I&A server checks the user id, then 
partitions the passphrase into five 
segments.  Once each segment is encrypted 
and verified, the user is authorized access 
to the system. 
Type Primary and Essential 
 
Typical Course of Events  
Actor Action System Response 
1.  This use case begins when a user tries to 
access the system 
 
2.  The user presents credentials: 
user_id, passphrase 
3.  Determine whether user_id is valid by 
searching user_id table 
 4. If user_id is valid, partition passphrase, 
and pass segments to identified encryption 
device, according to sequence. 
 5.  Receive responses back from encryption 
devices.  If all responses positive allow 
user access to system. 
6.  User Access System  
 
Table 5.4 Expanded Use Case 
 
The Use Case allows for us to map the sequential flow of activities into the 
activity diagram.  Activity diagrams provide a way to model the workflow of a business 
process, or in our case the Identification and Authentication process for the DPS.  This 
also allows us to model code-specific information such as a class operation for easier 
transition to an object oriented language.  
The activity diagram allows us to model the DPS workflow (Fig. 5.6).  The 
transition of passphrase from user to the I&A server and its subsequent segmenting 
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allows for easier understanding from a design point of view.  The notes to the side for 
pseudocoding allow for an easier implementation in coding the DPS in an object oriented 
language.  The activity diagram would assist as the model in the software development 

















if user_id is element of  
sequence_table
  then
     sequence_table
     return sequence#[ ]
   else
return false
PARTITION (passphrase, x, y)
segment string
segment ? copy passphrase starting at 
the xth character
ending at the yth character
return  segment
do while (valid and i < 6) // sentinel control for while
// loop breaks if any
// authenticates return false
// or if all five authenticates
// return true
segment :=  PARTITION (passphrase, x, y)
j := sequence_num[i]
i := i + 1
x := x + 8
y := y + 8
if j = 1
then valid := AUTHENTICATE_1 (user_id, segment)
else if j = 2
then valid := AUTHENTICATE_2 (user_id, segment)
else if j =3
then valid := AUTHENTICATE_3 ….
…
if (not valid) access denied






if user_id is element of encryption_table
      then
         if encrypt(segment) = e_table_seq  
            return true
         else
         return false
else 
   return false
encrypt function is systems administrator 
chosen encryption or hashing algorithm 
such as:
DES, 3DES, MD5, Blowfish, etc
AuthenticateIdentifyUser
 
Figure 5.5 Activity Diagram 
 
The sequence diagram provides a graphical view of a scenario that shows object 
interaction in a time-based sequence.  In the DPS, the sequence diagram provides us the 




 : User Segment (Passphrase) : 
Identification 
 : Proxy Compare(Epwd, Eseg) : 
Authenticate














    Figure 5.6 DPS Sequence Diagram 
 
Modeling in UML allows us to quickly see that the implementation of the DPS is 
not difficult.  We have clearly defined the boundaries and procedures for each phase of 
the login procedure of the DPS.  It also allows us to track the flow control of the program.  
We could further refine these in defining a state diagram for further security analysis.  
Use of a software tool such as Rational Rose would help us in porting the DPS into an 
actual object oriented program [Ref. 23]. 
For a pilot implementation of the DPS, we turned our attention to modification of 
a current operating system. 
F.   LINUX: A CANDIDATE FOR THE DPS 
After a review of operating systems and source code we decided that the ideal 
candidate for a first implementation of the DPS would be a Linux-based operating system 
that supports the Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM).  These operating systems 
include Caldera, Debian, Red Hat Linux, SuSe Linux, and MSC.Linux.  Even Apple OS-
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X has implemented Linux-PAM [Ref. 24].  Linux-PAM is a suite of shared libraries that 
enable local systems administrators to choose how applications authenticate users [Ref. 
24].  PAM allows the system administrator to set authentication policies for PAM-aware 
applications without having to recompile authentication programs. PAM does this by 
utilizing a pluggable, modular architecture.  The precise modules PAM calls for a 
particular application are determined by looking at that application's PAM configuration 
file in the /etc/pam.d directory [Ref. 24].  A Linux-PAM module is a single executable 
binary file that can be loaded by the Linux-PAM interface library. 
Currently PAM is employed by the I & A process for managing password 
security.  Tasks include enforcing policies regulating length and maximum age of 
passwords, tracking the changes users make to their passwords, and a host of other 
functions to deter password cracking.  However, the real strength in PAM is its flexibility 
in the authentication process. 
PAM gives systems administrators the ability to choose an authentication scheme.  
PAM allows authentication processes to range anywhere from voice recognition to one-
time passwords.  It does this by separating the I & A process into four types of 
management tasks: authentication management, account management, session 
management, and password management.  This process is all modular, allowing modules 
to be stacked upon one another.  The use of these modules enables PAM to search 
through several different password databases [Ref. 24].  For example, the Apache web 
server has a module that provides PAM services.  This allows additional operating system 
password and protection schemes to be used.  There are PAM modules that allow the use 
of series of databases to authenticate users.  This allows authentication using LINUX 
based password databases in conjunction with password databases such as those from 
NT, or Novell.  A systems administrator can create an authentication process, for a 
particular system in conformance with the PAM specifications, and then implement it 
without modifying any of the applications on the system.  The administrator can even 
incorporate current PAM processes without rewriting or recompiling these PAM-aware 
applications [Ref. 25]. 




2 auth  required /lib/security/pam_dps.so userid 
3 account required /lib/security/pam_segment.so  
4 password required /lib/security/pam_encrypt1.so 
5 password required /lib/security/pam_encrypt2.so 
6 password required /lib/security/pam_encrypt3.so 
7 password required /lib/security/pam_encrypt4.so 
8 password required /lib/security/pam_encrypt5.so 
9 session  required /lib/security/pam_unix.so 
 
The first line is a comment line.  The second line calls the module that prompts 
for a user name and passphrase.  It checks the user_id for validity using the information 
stored in the /user_id file.  If the user exists, the passphrase is then passed to the segment 
module.  This breaks the passphrase into five separate segments.  It then sends each of the 
segments to their respective encryption module.  The final line specifies that the session 
component of the pam_unix_so module will manage the session. 
As stated previously, the real strength in PAM is its flexibility.  PAM modules 
that are already created could be incorporated into any PAM aware application.  We 
could theoretically replace line 4 with 
 
 auth  required  /lib/security/pam_unix.so, 
 
allowing use of the standard Unix password scheme, which stores the password in the 
/etc/passwd.  We could also incorporate additional security modules such as the 
pam_cracklib.so to see if a segment can be easily determined by a dictionary-based 
password-cracking program. 
By stacking the modules, we force each of the encryption modules to return 
positive responses before allowing a user session access. 
G.   MONETARY COST OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The initial design layout of the DPS consists of a client, an I&A server, and five 
encryption devices.  The physical model cost would consist of the expenses related to the 
I&A server and the five encryption devices.  Each encryption device would consist of a 
standalone computer system.  Given this broad description, and without including cost of 
programming, our cost could run to several thousands of dollars. 
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One strategy by which we might reduce the cost would be to implement the DPS 
in a Linux Beowulf Cluster, which allows for the implementation of a master computer 
and slave computers.  The slave computers are basically processors equipped with 
storage.  This approach would eliminate the cost of monitors and keyboards for the 
encryption devices. 
Another possibility is the implementation of virtual machines on the I&A server 
itself.  This would eliminate the need for additional computers altogether.  VMware is a 
perfect example of a software solution of this kind.  It allows us to operate several guest 
operating systems within one host operating system.  These guest operating systems are 
given separate disk space as well as their own Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.  In 
essence, one can create a virtual network on a single machine.  This allows us to have one 
physical machine, that is logically an I&A server with five encryption devices (fig. 5.8).  
Each of the encryption databases would be accessible only through the guest operating 
system.  Even if the host system were compromised, the guest system would not 
necessarily be.  The cost of this would consist only of the software license, approximately 
three hundred dollars.   
 
VMware Running one Host Operating System and 





















Figure 5.7  Physical and Logical View VMWare 
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H.   WEAKNESSES OF THE DPS 
The DPS was introduced to counter the weaknesses of passwords and the single 
password file.  The DPS does not eliminate all security concerns.  It also has some 
weaknesses. 
1.  Denial of Service 
By introducing five segmented passphrases, the system relies on the response of 
all five segments before it grants authorization to a user access.  If any of these segments 
returns with a negative reply then user access is denied.  The system is vulnerable to the 
possibility of a denial of service if any one of the five segments is prevented from 
encrypting its segment.  The system is also vulnerable if any of the encryption devices is 
blocked from sending a positive response.  If this happens, the system is unavailable to a 
legitimate user.  This violates one of the tenets of computer security, namely availability 
of the system. 
We might address this by creating additional encryption devices serving as 
backup devices.  This solution would have an increased monetary cost for the additional 
hardware to implement this solution.  There could be additional computational 
complexity cost as the algorithm would have to be rewritten to accommodate additional 
devices, as well as the timing, sequencing, and selection of the devices were incorporated 
into the system. 
2.  Software Implementation 
Implementing the encryption in a software device gives us the advantages of 
flexibility and portability, ease of use, and ease of upgrade [Ref. 20].  The ability to 
choose the encryption scheme per device is one of the biggest advantages of the DPS.  It 
might also be its weakness.  The encryption algorithm could be replaced with a weak or 
reversible algorithm.  The management of the keys, in this case the password segments, 
must be secured.  The segments should not be stored on disk or written to a place in 
memory. 
The speed and cost of software implementation of encryption is another 
disadvantage.  Standard DES and RSA encryption, run inefficiently on general purpose 
processors.  We propose moving each encryption to a separate processor, that only 
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handles the encryption to counter this problem.  Even though some cryptographers have 
tried to make their algorithms more suitable for software implementation, specialized 
hardware will always be faster [Ref. 20]. 
An encryption algorithm running on a generalized computer has no physical 
protection, where hardware encryption devices can be securely encapsulated to prevent 
physical tampering [Ref. 20]. 
Hardware implementation of cryptography is also easier to install than the 
corresponding software version.  It is cheaper to put special-purpose encryption in 
hardware, than it is to put it in a microprocessor and software [Ref. 20].  Even when 
encrypted data comes from the computer, it is easier to install a dedicated hardware 
encryption device than it is to modify the computer’s systems software.  The only way to 
make encryption invisible to the user in software is to bury it deep inside the operating 
system, which is not easy [Ref. 20]. 
 3.  Mistyped Passphrase 
Though there are no statistics to track how many times users mistype their 
passwords, a longer passphrase would probably increase the number of failed login 
attempts simply because of its length. 
4.  Common Passphrases 
The potential problems of common passphrases still remain. One such problem 
would be the use of personal information (e.g., a father using all of his children’s names).  
An attacker using social engineering skills would still be capable of discovering the 
passphrase, as the previously-mentioned study suggests.  Another potential problem 
could be the increase in the small number forty-character pass phrases that may not be in 
the dictionary but that are nevertheless part of modern literature (e.g., 
Supercalifrajalisticexpialidocious!!!!!!)  The more cumbersome authentication method 
also increases the risk of a user writing down the passphrase, or, if the DPS is 
implemented on multiple systems, using the same phrase more than once. 
5.  Login Delays 
The added procedures for parsing the passphrase into segments, and encrypting 
each segment do not add additional delays to any one section of the DPS.  However, the 
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user is not authenticated until all encryption servers return a positive response.  Awaiting 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
Passwords and password files continue to be weaknesses in the Identification and 
Authentication.  There is a need to address this weakness because it has been identified as 
a consistent point of failure.  In this thesis we described how current computer systems 
incorporate passwords into their I&A process.  These systems included open-source 
UNIX-type operating systems as well as commercial off the shelf products for which the 
source code is not freely available, such as Microsoft’s network operating systems.  The 
weaknesses and commonly exploited vulnerabilities were analyzed to facilitate 
development of a solution that would not add significant cost to the end user. 
In particular, the work described in this thesis models a Distributed Password 
Scheme (DPS) in a network environment.  The DPS proposed replaces the eight-
character password with a forty-character passphrase, segments this passphrase, 
distributes the various segments among subsystems, and incorporates multiple encryption 
techniques for protecting these distributed segments.  The advantages of such an 
implementation are the elimination of a single “hackable” password file, the elimination 
of easily-guessed common passwords, and resistance to current “hacker tools”. 
The thesis presented a solution that did not add significant amount of 
computational complexity to current systems, while incorporating current available 
technology and approved cryptography.  The model was further designed and refined 
using the Universal Markup Language (UML).  
The model is a reference for implementing an I&A process that does not depend 
on the single password file.  The model has not been finalized or perfected; this leaves a 
number of targets for future research.  The next step would be the actual implementation 
of the DPS. 
In considering such an implementation, Linux-Pluggable Authentication Modules 
(Linux-PAM) were viewed as ideal candidates for the DPS.  Linux-PAM allows for the 
incorporation of various authentication methods without creating significant cumbersome 
changes to the operating system or current applications.  It also allows incorporation of 
current Linux-PAM security measures for strengthening the I&A process. 
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Actual implementation of a software solution in a network environment would 
allow the collection of data in a real-time environment.  This would allow the analysis of 
latency problems during transmission and storage of passwords and passphrases in 
memory as well as the protection of the databases in memory and secondary storage.  
Implementation costs were also discussed, including a possible cost-efficient prototype 
solution using VMWare on a single computer.  Future research is needed to study the 
feasibility and scalability aspects that result in a software design.  Future research can 
determine the extent and limitations of a software design, as well as a hardware 
implementation.  Possible research in analyzing both implementations could be done. 
The DPS is not presented as a “silver bullet” solution to computer security.  The 
thesis presented a solution to address the single password file weakness.   Implementing 
the DPS adds another layer of protection but in no way are we touting this as the 
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